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Norms	  of	  Belief	  	   Mona	  Simion1,	  Christoph	  Kelp2	  &	  Harmen	  Ghijsen3	  	   Abstract	  	  When	   in	   the	   business	   of	   offering	   an	   account	   of	   the	   epistemic	  normativity	  	  of	   belief,	   one	   is	   faced	   with	   the	   following	   dilemma:	   strongly	  externalist	  norms	  fail	  to	  account	  for	  the	  intuition	  of	  justification	  in	  radical	  deception	  scenarios,	  while	  milder	  norms	  are	   incapable	   to	  explain	  what	   is	  epistemically	  wrong	  with	   false	  beliefs.	  This	  paper	  has	   two	  main	  aims;	  we	  first	  look	  at	  one	  way	  out	  of	  the	  dilemma,	  defended	  by	  Timothy	  Williamson	  and	  Clayton	  Littlejohn,	  and	  argue	  that	  it	  fails.	  Second,	  we	  identify	  what	  we	  take	   to	   be	   the	   problematic	   assumption	   that	   underlies	   their	   account	   and	  offer	   an	   alternative	   way	   out.	   We	   put	   forth	   a	   knowledge-­‐first	   friendly	  normative	   framework	   for	   belief	   which	   grants	   justification	   to	   radically	  deceived	   subjects	   while	   at	   the	   same	   time	  acknowledging	   that	   their	   false	  beliefs	  are	  not	  epistemically	  good	  beliefs.	  	  	  	  
1.	  Introduction	  	  	  Justification	   is	  widely	  taken	  to	  be	  normative.	  The	  following	  appears	  to	  be	  an	  attractive	  way	  of	  capturing	  this	  thought:	  	  	  
The	   Deontic	   Thesis	   (DT).	   One’s	   ϕ-­‐ing	   is	   prima	   facie	   practically,	  morally,	   epistemically,	   etc.	   justified	   if	   and	   only	   if	   one	   prima	   facie	  practically,	  morally,	  epistemically,	  etc.	  permissibly	  ϕs.4	  	  	  If	  DT	  captures	  the	  way	  in	  which	   justification	   is	  normative,	   then,	  plausibly	  enough,	  the	  following	  captures	  the	  sense	  in	  which	  epistemic	  justification	  of	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  read.	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belief	  is	  normative:	  	  
The	  Deontic	  Thesis	  for	  Belief	  (DTB).	  One’s	  belief	  that	  p	  epistemically	  justified	  if	  and	  only	  if	  one	  epistemically	  permissibly	  believes	  that	  p.5	  	  It	   may	   be	   worth	   noting	   that	   we	   do	   not	   take	   DTB	   to	   offer	   a	   substantive	  account	  of	  justification	  or	  of	  the	  epistemic	  norm	  of	  belief.	  Rather,	  we	  take	  DTB	   to	   capture	   a	   highly	   plausible	   relation	   between	   justified	   belief	   and	  permissible	   belief.	   That	   said,	   given	   a	   substantive	   account	   of	   permissible	  belief,	  we	  can	  of	  course	  use	  DTB	  to	  derive	  a	  substantive	  account	  of	  justified	  belief	  and	  vice	  versa.	  	  Perhaps	   somewhat	   surprisingly,	   DTB	   quickly	   leads	   to	   a	   dilemma.	   To	  see	  how,	  just	  note	  that	  both	  of	  the	  following	  theses	  are	  plausible:	  	  	  
Negative	  Normative	   Status	   of	   False	  Beliefs	   (NFB).	  False	  beliefs	  are	  epistemically	   bad	   and,	   as	   such,	   enjoy	   epistemically	   negative	  normative	   status.	   For	   instance,	   Faye’s	   belief	   that	   Seattle	   is	   the	  capital	  of	  France	  is	  epistemically	  bad.	  
Justification	   of	   False	   Beliefs	   in	   Radical	   Skeptical	   Scenarios	   (JFB).	  The	  beliefs	  of	  agents	  in	  radical	  skeptical	  scenarios	  are	  justified.	  	  For	  instance,	   when	   Ned,	   who	   has	   recently	   been	   envatted	   and	   is	   now	  being	   fed	   deceptive	   experiences	   as	   of	   being	   in	   a	   normal	   physical	  environment,	  forms	  the	  belief	  that	  it’s	  sunny,	  his	  belief	  is	  justified.	  	  	   NFB	   enjoins	   us	   to	   construe	   the	  norm	  of	   belief	   as	   factive	   in	   the	   sense	  that	  only	  true	  beliefs	  can	  comply	  with	  the	  norm	  of	  belief.	  After	  all,	   if	   false	  beliefs	   have	   negative	   normative	   status,	   this	  will	   have	   to	   be	   because	   they	  violate	   the	   norm	   of	   belief.	   If	   false	   beliefs	   violate	   the	   norm	   of	   belief,	   this	  means	  that	  only	  true	  beliefs	  comply	  with	  the	  norm	  of	  belief.	  	   In	   contrast,	   JFB	   enjoins	   us	   to	   adopt	   an	   account	   of	   justified	   belief	  according	  to	  which	  justified	  belief	   is	  non-­‐factive.	  After	  all,	  agents	  like	  Ned	  are	  massively	  deceived.	  Nearly	  all	  of	   their	  beliefs	  are	   false.	   If	   their	  beliefs	  are	  nonetheless	  to	  come	  out	  justified,	  this	  means	  that	  it	  must	  be	  possible	  to	  have	  justified	  false	  beliefs.	  	  	   It	   is	   now	   easy	   to	   see	   how	   the	   dilemma	   arises:	   If,	   in	   view	   of	  NFB,	  we	  construe	   the	   norm	   of	   belief	   as	   factive,	   it	   follows	   from	  DTB	   that	   justified	  belief	  must	  be	  factive	  also.	  However,	  in	  that	  case	  we	  cannot	  have	  JFB.	  And,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  When	  it	  comes	  to	  belief,	  we	  will	  only	  discuss	  epistemic	  justification.	  As	  a	  result,	  we	  will	  use	  ‘justification’	  as	  a	  shorthand	  for	  ‘epistemic	  justification’	  in	  the	  context	  of	  attributions	  of	  epistemic	  justification	  to	  belief.	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conversely,	   if,	   in	   view	  of	   JFB,	  we	   take	   justified	   belief	   to	   be	  non-­‐factive,	   it	  follows	  from	  DTB	  that	  the	  norm	  of	  belief	  is	  non-­‐factive	  also	  in	  which	  case	  we	  cannot	  hold	  on	  to	  NFB.	  DTB	  thus	  appears	  to	  force	  us	  to	  give	  up	  at	  least	  one	  of	   two	  plausible	  claims,	   to	  wit	  NFB	  and	   JFB.	   In	   this	  way,	   it	   leads	   to	  a	  dilemma	   (which	   we	   will	   henceforth	   also	   refer	   to	   as	   ‘the	   permissibility-­‐justification	  dilemma’	  or	  ‘PJD’	  for	  short).	  	   This	   paper	   has	   two	   main	   aims;	   first,	   we	   will	   evaluate	   one	   recent	  strategy	   to	   exit	   PJD	   via	   the	   first	   horn,	   due,	   respectively,	   to	   Timothy	  Williamson	   (Forthcoming)	   and	   Clayton	   Littlejohn	   (Forthcoming).	   These	  authors	   defend	   the	   so-­‐called	   knowledge	   norm	   of	   belief,	   and	   attempt	   to	  explain	  away	  the	  intuition	  of	  justification	  for	  radically	  deceived	  subjects	  in	  terms	  of	  mere	  blamelessness.	  We	  will	  show	  that	  neither	  of	  their	  proposals	  is	  ultimately	  successful	  (§§3,4).	  What’s	  more,	  §5	  will	  provide	  independent	  theoretical	   reason	   for	   thinking	   that	   justified	  belief	   is	  non-­‐factive	  and	   that	  radically	   deceived	   agents	   have	   justified	   belief.	   If	   our	   argument	   is	  successful,	  it	  provides	  reason	  to	  favor	  a	  non-­‐factive	  account	  of	  the	  norm	  of	  belief.	   This	   brings	   us	   to	   the	   second	   and	  main	   aim	   of	   this	   paper:	   putting	  forth	  a	  general	  normative	  framework	  that	  enables	  us	  to	  escape	  PJD,	  that	  is,	  to	  allow	  for	  justification	  to	  be	  present	  in	  demon	  victims	  while,	  at	  the	  same	  time,	   explaining	   what	   is	   bad	   about	   false	   beliefs	   (§6).	   Crucially,	   the	  framework	  does	  not	  require	  us	  to	  abandon	  knowledge	  first	  epistemology.	  On	  the	  contrary,	  it	  is	  perfectly	  compatible	  with	  the	  independently	  plausible	  idea	  that	  knowledge	  is	  the	  norm	  of	  belief	  in	  a	  sense	  to	  be	  specified.	  	  	   First	   things	   first,	   however,	   we	   will	   now	   (§2)	   briefly	   present	   the	  accounts	   of	   the	   norm	   of	   belief	   and	   of	   justified	   belief	   defended	   by	  knowledge	  firsters	  such	  as	  Williamson	  and	  Littlejohn.	  	  
2.	  The	  Knowledge	  Norm	  of	  Belief	  	  There	   is	   a	   growing	   number	   of	   epistemologists	   who	   accept	   the	   following	  norm	  of	  belief:	  	  	  
The	   Knowledge	   Norm	   of	   Belief	   (KNB).	  One	  must:	   believe	   that	   p	   iff	  one	  knows	  that	  p.	  	  	  A	  belief	  is	  permissible	  by	  KNB,	  then,	  iff	  it	  qualifies	  as	  knowledge.	  It	  is	  easy	  to	   see	   that,	   on	   KNB,	   the	   norm	   of	   belief	   is	   factive.	   After	   all,	   knowledge	   is	  factive.	  If	  permissible	  belief	  requires	  knowledge,	  then	  only	  true	  beliefs	  are	  permissible.	  In	  this	  way,	  KNB	  can	  easily	  make	  sense	  of	  NFB.	  	  	   But	  now	  note	  that,	  in	  conjunction	  with	  DTB,	  KNB	  entails:	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Justified	  Belief	  is	  Knowledge	  (JB=K).	  One’s	  belief	  that	  p	  is	  justified	  if	  and	  only	  if	  one	  knows	  that	  p	  	  	  It	   may	   be	   worth	   noting	   that	   a	   number	   of	   knowledge	   firsters,	   including	  Williamson,	   accept	   JB=K.	   At	   the	   same	   time,	   it	   is	   easy	   to	   see	   that	   anyone	  committed	   to	   JB=K	   will	   be	   unable	   to	   accommodate	   JFB.	   After	   all,	   as	   we	  already	  noted,	  it	  follows	  from	  JB=K	  that	  only	  true	  beliefs	  are	  justified.	  Since	  the	  beliefs	  of	  agents	  in	  radical	  skeptical	  scenarios	  are	  nearly	  all	  false,	  they	  are	  not	  justified.	  	  Knowledge	  firsters	  typically	  take	  a	  knowledge	  norm	  of	  belief	   to	  enjoy	  independent	   theoretical	   motivation.	   The	   fact	   that	   NFB	   needs	   to	   be	  accommodated	   is	   one	   of	   the	   prima	   sources	   in	   this	   regard.	   And	   since,	  together	  with	  the	  uncontentious	  DTB,	  KNB	  entails	  JB=K,	  the	  same	  goes	  for	  JB=K.	  For	  that	  reason,	  knowledge	  firsters	  typically	  think	  that	  the	  right	  way	  out	   of	   the	   PJD	   is	   to	   explain	   away	   the	   intuition	   of	   justification	   in	   radical	  deception	  scenarios.	  In	  particular,	  one	  popular	  line	  has	  been	  to	  argue	  that,	  whilst	  falling	  short	  of	  justification,	  radically	  deceived	  subjects	  nonetheless	  enjoy	  an	  excellent	  excuse	  for	  believing	  as	  they	  do,	  as	  a	  result	  of	  which	  their	  beliefs	  are	  blameless.	  According	  to	  advocates	  of	   this	   line,	   those	  who	  have	  the	   intuition	   of	   justification	   here	   simply	   confuse	   justification	   with	  blameless.	   In	   what	   follows,	   we	  will	   take	   a	   closer	   look	   at	   two	   prominent	  defenses	   of	   this	   strategy	   in	   recent	   literature,	   one	   due	   to	   Williamson	  (Forthcoming),	  the	  other	  due	  to	  Littlejohn	  (Forthcoming).	  	  	  	  
3.	  Primary	  and	  Derivative	  Norms	  	  	  
3.1	  Williamson’s	  Normative	  Framework	  Williamson’s	   account	  of	   the	   intuition	  of	   justified	  belief	   in	   cases	  of	   radical	  deception	   makes	   use	   of	   a	   normative	   framework	   that	   is	   developed	   in	  analogy	   to	   some	   clear	   cases	   of	   norm-­‐compliance	   and	   norm-­‐violation	  outside	  of	  the	  realm	  of	  epistemology.	  It	  will	  be	  helpful	  to	  start	  with	  one	  of	  these	  cases	  before	  going	  on	  to	  the	  application	  to	  epistemology.	  	  Following	  Williamson,	  let’s	  consider	  promises.	  Williamson	  holds,	  quite	  plausibly,	  that	  one	  complies	  with	  the	  norm	  of	  promise	  keeping	  if	  and	  only	  if	   one	   does	  what	   one	   promised	   to	   do	   (Forthcoming,	   p.4).	   For	   instance,	   if	  you	  promise	  to	  pick	  up	  John	  at	  the	  airport	  by	  2pm,	  then	  you	  will	  have	  kept	  your	  promise	  if	  and	  only	  if	  you	  pick	  up	  John	  at	  the	  airport	  by	  2pm.	  If	  you	  are	  somehow	  prevented	  from	  reaching	  the	  airport,	  say,	  by	  car	  trouble,	  then	  you	  will	  not	  have	  kept	  your	  promise.	   Indeed,	  you	  will	  not	  have	  kept	  your	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promise	  even	  if	  you	  have	  very	  good	  reasons	  for	  not	  going	  to	  the	  airport,	  or	  if	   you	   have	   done	   everything	   in	   your	   power	   to	   reach	   the	   airport	   but	  nevertheless	  failed	  to	  reach	  it.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  if	  you	  try	  your	  best	  to	  be	  late	  but	  nevertheless	  arrive	  at	  the	  airport	  on	  time,	  then	  you	  will	  have	  kept	  your	   promise.	   So	   one	   complies	  with	   the	   norm	  of	   promise	   keeping	   if	   and	  only	  if	  one	  does	  what	  one	  promised	  to	  do.	  	  	   Next,	   Williamson	   introduces	   a	   distinction	   between	   what	   he	   calls	  ‘primary	  norms’	  and	  ‘derivative	  norms’.	  One	  example	  of	  a	  primary	  norm	  is	  the	   norm	   of	   promise	   keeping	   just	   mentioned.	   Crucially,	   according	   to	  Williamson,	   justification	   is	   linked	  exclusively	   to	   compliance	  with	  primary	  norms.	  This	  means	   that	   the	   relevant	   form	  permissibility	  at	   issue	   in	  DT	   is	  unpacked	  in	  terms	  of	  compliance	  with	  the	  primary	  norm.	  	  	   Derivative	   norms	   are	   generated	   by	   primary	   norms.	   By	   way	   of	  illustration,	  let’s	  return	  to	  the	  case	  of	  promise	  keeping.	  The	  thought	  is	  that	  the	  primary	  norm	  of	  promise	  keeping	  (P)	  gives	  rise	   to	  a	  secondary	  norm	  (DP)	   that	   requires	   people	   to	   have	   the	  disposition	   to	   keep	   their	   promises	  and	  a	  tertiary	  norm	  (ODP)	  requiring	  people	  to	  do	  what	  a	  promise	  keeper	  would	  do	  in	  a	  given	  situation.	  The	  reason	  for	  this	  is	  that	  given	  that	  it’s	  good	  to	  keep	  your	  promises,	  there	  also	  seems	  to	  be	  something	  good	  about	  being	  the	  kind	  of	  person	  who	  is	  generally	  disposed	  to	  keep	  their	  promises,	  and,	  furthermore,	  to	  do	  what	  this	  kind	  of	  person	  would	  do.	  One	  reason	  for	  this	  is	   that	   complying	  with	   these	   derivative	   norms	  will	   usually	  make	   it	  more	  likely	  that	  one	  also	  complies	  with	  the	  primary	  norm.	  	   Of	   course,	   since	   justification	   is	   connected	   to	   primary	   norms,	  compliance	   with	   secondary	   and	   tertiary	   norms	   cannot	   give	   one	  justification.	  However,	  Williamson	   grants	   that	   even	  when	  one	  breaks	   the	  primary	   norm,	   one	  may	   still	   comply	   with	   the	   secondary	   and/or	   tertiary	  norms	   generated	   by	   it.	   Moreover,	   and	   most	   importantly	   for	   present	  purposes,	   compliance	  with	   secondary	   and	   tertiary	   norms	  may	   still	  make	  for	   a	   good	   excuse,	   thus	   rendering	   the	   agent	   blameless	   for	   violating	   the	  primary	  norm.	  For	  instance,	  if	  you	  promised	  to	  pick	  up	  John	  at	  the	  airport	  by	  2pm	  and	  arrive	  there	  only	  at	  3pm	  you	  did	  not	  keep	  your	  promise.	  You	  violated	  the	  primary	  norm	  of	  promise-­‐keeping,	  P.	  Even	  so,	  suppose	  that	  the	  reason	  why	  you	  are	   late	   is	   that	  you	  had	  car	   trouble,	   then	  borrowed	  a	  car	  from	  a	  friend	  to	  still	  be	  able	  to	  keep	  your	  promise,	  and	  then	  had	  car	  trouble	  again,	   thereby	   becoming	   unable	   to	   fulfill	   your	   promise.	  What	   you	   did	   is	  certainly	   something	   a	   promise	   keeper	   would	   do.	   As	   a	   result	   you	   satisfy	  ODP.	   If,	   in	  addition,	  you	  are	  a	  promise	  keeper,	  you	  also	  satisfy	  DP.	   In	  this	  case,	  even	  though	  you	  violate	  P,	  you	  are	  blameless	  for	  doing	  so	  in	  virtue	  of	  satisfying	  DP	  and	  ODP.	  In	  this	  way,	  complying	  with	  derivative	  norms	  may	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generate	  excuses	  for	  violations	  of	  the	  primary	  norms.	  	  	   It’s	  not	  too	  hard	  to	  see	  how	  Williamson	  wants	  to	  apply	  this	  normative	  framework	   in	   epistemology,	   and	   specifically	   to	   radically	   deceived	   agents.	  An	   important	  motivation	   for	   the	   idea	   that	   radically	  deceived	  agents	  have	  justified	   beliefs	   is	   that	   such	   subjects	   are	   “following	   exactly	   the	   same	  cognitive	   instincts	  as	   [the	  ones	   they	   follow]	   in	   forming	   the	  same	  belief	   in	  the	  good	  case”	  (Forthcoming,	  p.18).	  Radically	  deceived	  agents	  thus	  believe	  what	  a	  good	  believer—i.e.,	  someone	  who	  believes	  only	  what	  they	  know—would	  believe	  in	  the	  current	  situation,	  and	  they	  so	  believe	  because	  they	  are	  the	   kind	   of	   people	   who	   believe	   only	   what	   they	   know.	   To	   put	   this	   in	  normative	  terms	  again,	  if	  the	  primary	  norm	  (J)	  for	  belief	  is	  knowledge,	  then	  there	   is	   also	   a	   derivative	   secondary	   norm	   that	   one	   should	   be	   generally	  disposed	  to	  believe	  only	  what	  one	  knows	  (DJ),	  and	  a	  tertiary	  norm	  that	  one	  should	   believe	  what	   one	  who	   is	   generally	   disposed	   to	   believe	   only	  what	  one	   knows	  would	   believe	   in	   the	   current	   situation	   (ODJ).	   On	   this	   picture,	  our	  radically	  deceived	  agent,	  Ned,	  does	  not	  comply	  with	  the	  primary	  norm	  for	  belief.	  As	  a	  result,	  he	  is	  not	  justified.	  However,	  he	  does	  comply	  with	  the	  derivative	  norms,	  DJ	  and	  ODJ.	  Ned	  believes	  exactly	  what	  someone	  who	   is	  disposed	   to	   believe	   only	   what	   they	   know	   would	   believe	   in	   the	   current	  situation,	  thus	  satisfying	  ODJ.	  Moreover,	  we	  may	  assume,	  he	  is	  disposed	  to	  believe	   only	   what	   he	   knows	   and	   so	   complies	   with	   DJ.	   Just	   as	   in	   the	  aforementioned	   case	   of	   promise	   keeping,	   even	   though	   Ned	   violates	   the	  primary	  norm,	  J,	  he	  has	  an	  excellent	  excuse	  for	  this	  in	  virtue	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  he	  satisfies	  DJ	  and	  ODJ.	  	   With	  Williamson’s	  framework	  in	  play,	  let’s	  return	  to	  the	  question	  as	  to	  how	   he	   explains	   the	   intuition	   that	   the	   beliefs	   of	   agents	   like	   Ned	   are	  justified.	   The	   answer	   is	   that	   Williamson	   offers	   an	   error	   theory	   for	   this	  intuition	  that	  has	  non-­‐epistemic	  precedent	  and	  theoretical	  backing	  by	  the	  normative	  framework.	  To	  see	  how	  this	  works,	  let’s	  return	  once	  more	  to	  the	  case	   of	   promise	   keeping.	   In	   our	   toy	   case,	   the	   fact	   that	   you	   do	   what	   a	  promise-­‐keeper	   would	   do	   (thus	   complying	   with	   ODP)	   and,	   in	   fact,	   are	   a	  promise	  keeper	  yourself	  (thus	  complying	  with	  DP)	  renders	  you	  blameless	  here	   and	  may	   lead	  us	   to	   sympathize	  with	   you.	  When	  presented	  with	   the	  question	   as	   to	   whether	   you	   are	   justified	   in	   acting	   as	   you	   did,	   our	  sympathies	   may	   incline	   us	   to	   think	   that	   you	   were	   justified	   rather	   than	  unjustified.	  However,	  this	  does	  not	  change	  the	  fact	  that	  you	  violated	  P,	  the	  primary	  norm	  of	  promise	  keeping.	  Since	  justification	  is	  tied	  to	  compliance	  with	   the	   primary	   norm,	   this	  means	   that	   your	   action	   is	   really	   unjustified.	  Rather,	  what	  is	  going	  on	  with	  those	  who	  have	  the	  intuition	  of	  justification	  is	   that	   they	   mistake	   blamelessness	   for	   justification.	   And	   the	   same	   goes,	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mutatis	  mutandis,	  for	  the	  beliefs	  of	  radically	  deceived	  agents.	  The	  fact	  that	  Ned	  is	  someone	  who	  is	  generally	  disposed	  to	  believe	  only	  what	  he	  knows	  and	   that	   he	   believes	   what	   a	   person	   so	   disposed	   would	   believe	   (thus	  complying	   with	   DJ	   and	   ODJ)	   renders	   him	   blameless	   and	  may	   lead	   us	   to	  sympathize	   with	   him.	   When	   presented	   with	   the	   question	   as	   to	   whether	  Ned’s	   beliefs	   are	   justified,	   it	   may	   even	   lead	   us	   to	   think	   that	   they	   are	  justified	  rather	  than	  unjustified.	  But	  just	  as	  in	  the	  case	  of	  promise	  keeping,	  this	  simply	  does	  not	  change	  the	  fact	  that	  Ned	  violated	  J,	  the	  primary	  norm	  of	   belief,	   and	   that,	   as	   a	   result,	   Ned’s	   beliefs	   are	   really	   unjustified.	   Again,	  those	   who	   have	   the	   intuition	   of	   justification	   mistake	   blamelessness	   for	  justification.6	  	  	   Williamson	   thus	   exits	   the	   dilemma	   by	   embracing	   a	   factive	   norm	   of	  belief	  and	  offering	  an	  error	  theory	  for	  the	  intuition	  of	  justification	  in	  cases	  of	  radically	  deceived	  agents.	  	  	  
3.2	  Against	  Mere	  Blamelessness	  	  While	  Williamson’s	   treatment	  of	   the	  dilemma	   is	  attractive,	   there	   is	  also	  a	  problematic	   feature	   of	   his	   framework.	   There	   is	   reason	   to	   believe	   that	  Williamson’s	   error	   theory	   remains	   ultimately	   less	   than	   fully	   satisfactory.	  To	  see	  this,	  consider	  the	  following	  case:	  	  	  
Brainwashed	   Cognizer.	   Unfortunate	   Brianna	   has	   recently	   been	  brainwashed	   into	   taking	   a	   red	   sky	   in	   the	   evening	   as	   an	   indication	  that	  something	  bad	  will	  happen	   to	  her	  soon.	   Just	  now	  Brianna	  has	  noticed	   that	   the	   evening	   sky	   is	   red	   and	   has	   formed	   the	  corresponding	  belief	  about	  her	  near	  future.	  	  	  	   Intuitively,	  Brianna’s	  belief	  that	  something	  bad	  will	  happen	  to	  her	  soon	  is	  not	  justified.	  It	  is	  easy	  to	  see	  that	  Brianna	  does	  not	  comply	  with	  a	  truth-­‐related	   norm	   J	   (suppose,	   as	   we	   may,	   that	   nothing	   bad	   will	   happen	   to	  Brianna).	  Even	  so,	  she	  does	  comply	  with	  derivative	  norms	  DJ	  and	  ODJ,	  or	  so	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  We’d	  like	  to	  stress	  that	  we	  do	  not	  take	  the	  proposed	  excusing	  conditions	  (DJ	  and	  ODJ)	  as	  necessary	   and/or	   sufficient	   for	   blamelessness.	   Crucially,	   the	   problem	   these	   cases	   of	  radical	  deception	  pose	  for	  him	  does	  not	  require	  him	  to	  give	  such	  conditions.	  Providing	  a	  theoretically	   motivated	   account	   of	   the	   intuition	   of	   justification	   in	   cases	   of	   radical	  deception	  will	  do.	  And	  Williamson’s	  framework	  does	  just	  this.	  If	  those	  who	  have	  pressed	  the	   problem	   of	   radically	   deceived	   agents	   against	   the	   likes	   of	  Williamson	  want	   to	  make	  their	   objection	   stick,	   the	   onus	   is	   back	   on	   them	   to	   provide	   reason	   to	   believe	   that	   the	  intuition	  of	  justification	  in	  these	  cases	  is	  not	  mistaken	  or	  at	  least	  that	  Williamson’s	  error	  theory	  remains	  less	  than	  fully	  satisfactory	  after	  all.	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we	  may	  assume.	  After	  all,	  Brianna	  may	  well	  be	  a	  person	  who	  is	  generally	  disposed	  to	  believe	  only	  what	  she	  knows	  (including	  about	  her	  future),	  and	  she	   believes	   what	   someone	   who	   is	   so	   disposed	   (i.e.,	   she	   herself)	   would	  believe	   in	   the	   current	   situation.7	  But	   now	   notice	   that	   this	   means	   that	  Brianna’s	  belief	  is	  on	  a	  normative	  par,	  as	  it	  were,	  with	  the	  beliefs	  of	  Ned,	  at	  least	  as	  far	  as	  Williamson’s	  framework	  is	  concerned.	  After	  all,	  both	  violate	  the	  primary	  norm	  of	  belief,	  J,	  whilst	  complying	  with	  the	  derivative	  norms,	  DJ	  and	  ODJ.	  Moreover,	  it	  is	  independently	  plausible	  that,	  in	  both	  cases,	  the	  agents	  are	  blameless	  for	  believing	  as	  they	  do.	  Crucially,	  however,	  while	  the	  case	  of	  Ned	  generates	  an	  intuition	  of	  justification,	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Brianna	  we	  get	  just	  the	  opposite	  intuition.	  So	  what	  Williamson’s	  framework	  has	  not	  yet	  explained	   is	   why	   only	   some	   of	   the	   agents	   who	   comply	   with	   DJ	   and	   ODJ	  appear	   justified.	   A	   factor	   that	   is	   at	   least	   relevant	   to	   our	   intuitions	   about	  justification	   is	   still	   left	   out	   of	   the	   picture.8	  By	   the	   same	   token,	   the	  worry	  remains	   that	   this	   difference	   in	   intuitions	   is	   sourced	   in	   another	   relevant	  normative	  distinction	  between	  Brianna	  and	  Ned,	  one	  that	   is	  not	  captured	  by	  Williamson’s	  framework.	  	  	  	   One	  response	  to	  this	  complaint	  is	  that	  there	  are	  simply	  different	  ways	  of	  being	  blameless	  and	  different	  ways	  of	  being	  excused.	  Given	  the	  variety	  of	   excuses	   that	   people	   use	   in	   response	   to	   norm	   violations,	   one	   should	  expect	   there	   to	   be	   different	   kinds	   of	   blamelessness.	   Our	   intuitions	  might	  then	  simply	  be	  tracking	  these	  different	  kinds	  of	  blamelessness	  rather	  than	  a	  difference	  between	  being	  blameless	  and	  being	  justified.	  But	  to	  make	  this	  response	   stick	  one	   should	  be	  able	   to	  offer	   an	  account	  of	   at	   least	   some	  of	  these	  different	  kinds	  of	  blamelessness.	   In	  the	  following	  section,	  we’ll	   turn	  to	  Littlejohn’s	  proposal,	  which	  does	  exactly	  this.	  	  	  	  
4.	  Justifications,	  Excuses	  and	  Exemptions	  	  	  
3.1	  Littlejohn	  and	  the	  Trichotomous	  Scheme	  	  According	   to	   Littlejohn	   (Forthcoming),	   we	   should	   hesitate	   to	   draw	  conclusions	  about	   a	  difference	   in	   justification	  on	   the	  basis	  of	   an	   intuitive	  difference	  between	  the	  case	  of	  Ned,	  our	  radically	  deceived	  agent,	  and	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  Note	  that	  Williamson	  himself	  accepts	  that	  compliance	  with	  the	  secondary	  norm	  entails	  compliance	  with	  the	  tertiary	  norm:	  “Suppose	  that	  A	  complies	  with	  DN.	  Then	  in	  any	  situation,	  what	  A	  does	  is	  what	  some	  agent	  who	  complies	  with	  DN	  does,	  so	  A	  complies	  with	  ODN.”	  (Forthcoming,	  p.26)	  8	  This	  point	  against	  treating	  radically	  deceived	  subjects	  as	  merely	  blameless	  rather	  than	  justified	  is	  a	  familiar	  one	  (e.g.	  Pryor,	  2001;	  Bird,	  2007;	  Kelp,	  Forthcoming-­‐b;	  Kelp	  and	  Ghijsen,	  2016).	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case	  of	  a	  brainwashed	  subject	  like	  Brianna:	  	  	   Why	   shouldn’t	   we	   say	   that	   this	   [Ned’s	   case]	   is	   just	   another	   case	   of	  excuse,	  albeit	  one	  in	  which	  the	  grounds	  for	  excusing	  differ	  from	  those	  that	  are	  present	  in	  cases	  of	  brainwashing?	  If	  the	  category	  of	  excuse	  is	  sufficiently	   heterogenous,	   we	   could	   say	   that	   insanity	   and	   ignorance	  both	  function	  as	  excuses,	  albeit	  excuses	  that	  do	  their	  work	  in	  different	  ways.	  Maybe	  it’s	  right	  to	  say	  that	  mere	  blamelessness	  doesn’t	  account	  for	  the	  positive	  reaction	  to	  the	  case,	  but	  maybe	  it’s	  a	  mistake	  to	  equate	  excuses	  with	  mere	  blamelessness.	  All	  we	  know	  about	  excuses	  thus	  far	  is	   that	   they	  aren’t	   justifications	  and	   if	   the	  category	   isn’t	  homogenous,	  maybe	  some	  excuses	  involve	  some	  sort	  of	  positive	  element,	  something	  that	  we	  might	  admire,	  praise,	  commend,	  etc.	  (Forthcoming,	  p.9).	  	  	  Inspired	  by	  Strawson	  (1962),	  Littlejohn	  ventures	  to	  work	  out	   this	   idea	   in	  more	   detail	   by	   invoking	   a	   trichotomous	   normative	   framework,	   in	   which	  excuses	   and	   justifications	   are	   distinguished	   from	   a	   third	   category,	   i.e.,	  exemptions	   (Forthcoming,	  p.10).	  The	   thought	   is	   that	   subjects	   are	  exempt	  from	   norm	   compliance	   when	   their	   rational	   capacities	   are	   absent	   or	  compromised	  to	  such	  an	  extent	  that	  they	  simply	  do	  not	  have	  the	  required	  prerequisites	  for	  being	  responsible	  agents	  who	  can	  be	  held	  accountable	  for	  their	   actions.	   This	   kind	   of	   blamelessness	   is	   different	   from	   one	  where	   an	  agent	   has	   an	   excuse	   for	   their	   actions:	   in	   such	   a	   case	   all	   the	   required	  rational	  capacities	  are	  present,	  they	  are	  exercised	  in	  an	  excellent	  way,	  yet	  a	  norm	  is	  still	  violated.	  Indeed,	  if	  one	  didn’t	  exercise	  one’s	  rational	  capacities	  in	  an	  excellent	  way,	  then	  one	  wouldn’t	  be	  excused	  for	  violating	  the	  norm.	  Just	  suppose	  that	  the	  reason	  why	  you	  didn’t	  pick	  up	  John	  at	  the	  airport	  by	  2pm	   is	   that	   you	   simply	   forgot	   about	   it.	   Forgetting	   something	   that	   you	  should	  have	  taken	  care	  to	  remember	  is	  exactly	  not	  the	  sort	  of	  excuse	  that	  will	   get	   you	   off	   the	   hook	   for	   breaking	   one’s	   promise.	   What’s	   needed	   to	  excuse	  oneself	  for	  norm	  violation	  is	  an	  excellent	  exercise	  of	  one’s	  rational	  capacities.	  	  	   Both	   these	   forms	   of	   blameless	   norm-­‐violation,	   i.e.,	   exemption	   and	  excuse,	  should	  be	  distinguished	  from	  genuine	  compliance	  with	  the	  relevant	  norm	   and	   hence	   justification.	   (Note	   that	   Littlejohn,	   like	   Williamson,	   ties	  justification	   to	   compliance	  with	  what	  Williamson	  would	   call	   the	   relevant	  primary	   norm.)	   It	   is	   only	   if	   one	   actually	   fulfills	   the	   conditions	   of	   one’s	  promise,	   and	  does	  what	  one	  promised	   to	  do,	   that	  one	  has	   complied	  with	  the	   norm	   of	   promise	   keeping	   and	   so	   acts	   justifiably.	   Similarly,	   it	   is	   only	  when	   one	   knows	   what	   one	   believes	   that	   one	   has	   complied	   with	   the	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knowledge	  norm	  of	  belief,	  and	  so	  believes	  justifiably.	  	  	   The	  threefold	  distinction	  between	  exemption,	  excuse,	  and	  justification	  appears	   to	   provide	   us	  with	  what	  we	  need	   to	  make	   sense	   of	   the	   intuitive	  difference	   between	   Brianna	   and	   Ned.	   Whereas	   Brianna’s	   rational	  capacities	  are	  momentarily	  compromised	  by	  having	  been	  brainwashed	  into	  taking	   a	   red	   sky	   in	   the	   evening	   as	   an	   indication	   that	   something	   bad	  will	  happen	  to	  her	  soon,	  Ned	  has	  no	  such	  difficulties.	  Ned’s	  rational	  capacities	  are	  intact,	  and,	  in	  fact,	  one	  could	  argue	  that	  Ned	  exercises	  those	  capacities	  in	  an	  excellent	  way	  in	  coming	  to	  believe	  as	  he	  does.	  Ned	  is	  forming	  beliefs	  on	   the	   basis	   of	   his	   perceptual	   experiences	   in	   a	   way	   that	   would	   have	  provided	  him	  with	   accurate	  beliefs	   about	  his	   environment	   if	   only	  he	  had	  not	  been	  radically	  deceived.	  This	  means	  that	  Ned	   is	  excused	  for	  believing	  as	  he	  does,	  whereas	  Brianna	   is	  exempted.	  The	  difference	  between	  excuse	  and	  exemption	   thus	  allows	  us	   to	  explain	   the	   intuitive	  difference	  between	  the	   cases	   of	   Brianna	   and	  Ned	  without	   supposing	   that	   either	   of	   them	  has	  justified	   beliefs.	   Yes,	   radically	   deceived	   subjects	   are	   exercising	   their	  rational	  capacities	   in	  an	  excellent	  way,	  but	   this	  could	   just	   show	  that	   they	  have	   an	   excellent	   excuse	   rather	   than	   a	   fully-­‐fledged	   justification.	  More	   is	  needed	  to	  show	  otherwise.	  	  	  
3.2	  Against	  Mere	  Excuses	  	  Unfortunately,	   there	   is	   reason	   to	   believe	   that	   Littlejohn’s	   account	   also	  remains	  ultimately	  unsatisfactory.	  To	  see	  why,	  consider	  first	  the	  following	  case	  (adapted	  from	  (Goldman,	  1988)):	  	  	  
Benighted	   Cognizer.	   Ben	   is	   a	  member	   of	   an	   isolated	   and	   benighted	  community.	   Many	   of	   his	   methods	   of	   belief	   formation	   have	   no	  connection	  to	  truth	  whatsoever,	  but	  they	  are	  common	  lore	  in	  Ben’s	  community.	  Let’s	  suppose	  that	  Ben	  wants	  to	  know	  the	  best	  time	  to	  sow	  his	   crops.	  According	   to	   the	   lore	  of	  his	   community,	   in	  order	   to	  achieve	   this,	   he	  will	   first	   have	   to	   sacrifice	   a	   goat	   and	   bury	   it	   in	   a	  sacred	   place.	   Then	   he	  must	   sit	   outside	   his	   house	   until	   it	   starts	   to	  rain	  and	  then	  return	  to	  the	  burial	  place.	  If	  the	  sun	  is	  shining	  again	  by	  the	  time	  he	  will	  have	  arrived,	   it	   is	   time	  to	  sow	  the	  crops.	   If	  not,	  he	  will	  have	  to	  return	  home	  and	  continue	  sitting	  outside	  his	  house	  until	  the	   next	   rainfall.	   Ben	   has	   flawlessly	   implemented	   this	   procedure	  and	  has	  thereby	  arrived	  at	  a	  belief	  that	  it	  is	  time	  to	  sow	  the	  crops.	  	  	   Ben’s	   belief	   is	   unjustified.	   After	   all,	   Ben’s	   belief	   is	   the	   outcome	   of	   a	  method	   that	   is,	   unbeknownst	   to	   him,	   an	   epistemically	   disastrous	  way	   of	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forming	  beliefs.	  Even	  so,	  Ben	  is	  surely	  still	  blameless	  for	  not	  knowing	  this,	  given	  that	  the	  method	  is	  so	  widely	  accepted	  within	  his	  own	  community.	  	  Crucially,	   in	   this	   case,	   Ben’s	   rational	   capacities	   do	   not	   appear	  compromised	   in	   a	   way	   that	   makes	   him	   unaccountable	   for	   his	   actions;	  instead,	  Ben	  appears	  to	  exercise	  his	  rational	  capacities	  in	  an	  excellent	  way	  given	  his	  circumstances.	  Ben	  does	  what	  most	  rational	  people	  would	  do	  in	  his	   situation:	   to	   find	   out	   the	   answer	   to	   his	   question,	   he	   uses	   a	   complex	  method	   that	   enjoys	   widespread	   acceptance	   within	   his	   community.	   Ben’s	  case,	   like	   Ned’s,	   thus	   falls	   in	   Littlejohn’s	   category	   of	   excuse:	   Ben	   is	  blameless	   for	   believing	   as	   he	   does	   because,	   although	   he	   has	   violated	   the	  primary	  norm	  of	  belief,	  he	  has	  exercised	  his	  rational	  capacities	  excellently.	  	  	   This	   means	   that	   there	   is,	   again,	   an	   intuitive	   difference	   between	   two	  cases—i.e.,	   the	  case	  of	  Ned	  and	   the	  case	  of	  Ben—that	   is	  not	  explained	  by	  Littlejohn’s	   trichotomous	   framework.	   Ned	   but	   not	   Ben	   appears	   to	   be	  genuinely	  justified.	  However,	  by	  Littlejohn’s	  framework,	  both	  Ben	  and	  Ned	  end	  up	  on	  a	  normative	  par:	  both	  fail	  to	  satisfy	  the	  norm	  of	  belief	  and	  both	  are	  blameless	  in	  virtue	  of	  enjoying	  an	  excuse	  for	  their	  beliefs.	  Again,	  there	  seems	  to	  be	  a	  relevant	  distinction,	  this	  time	  between	  Ben	  and	  Ned,	  which	  is	  not	  captured	  by	  the	  proposed	  framework.	  	  	   Of	   course,	   one	   could	   now	   try	   to	   argue	   that	   there	   is	   yet	   another	  distinction	   to	  be	  made	  between	   types	  of	   excuses,	  where	  Ben	   falls	  on	  one	  side	  of	   the	  distinction,	  and	  Ned	  on	   the	  other.	  However,	  we	   think	   that	   the	  prospects	   for	   such	   a	  move	   are	   dim.	   The	   reason	   for	   this	   is	   that	   alongside	  these	  intuitive	  difficulties,	  there	  is	  also	  theoretical	  reason	  to	  think	  that	  the	  Williamson-­‐Littlejohn	   line	   is	  mistaken.	  To	  see	   this,	  note	   first	   that	   there	   is	  an	   important	   structural	   difference	   between	   the	   cases	   of	   Ned	   on	   the	   one	  hand	  and	  of	  Ben	  and	  Brianna	  on	  the	  other.	  Ned	   forms	  his	  beliefs	   in	  ways	  that	   enjoy	   a	   strong	   connection	   to	   truth	   and	   knowledge:	   in	   normal	  circumstances,	   his	  ways	   of	   belief	   formation	   do	   give	   him	   true	   beliefs	   and	  even	  knowledge.	  In	  fact,	  there	  is	  a	  clear	  sense	  in	  which	  he	  is	  simply	  unlucky	  to	  be	  in	  the	  predicament	  he	  finds	  himself	  in	  and	  so	  unlucky	  not	  to	  acquire	  true	  beliefs	  and	  knowledge.	  In	  contrast,	  the	  same	  is	  not	  true	  of	  either	  Ben	  or	  Brianna.	  For	  them	  it	  is	  not	  as	  if	  had	  circumstances	  be	  more	  hospitable,	  their	   ways	   of	   belief	   formation	   would	   have	   generated	   true	   belief,	   never	  mind	  knowledge.	  Rather,	  Ben	  and	  Brianna’s	  ways	  of	  belief	  formation	  enjoy	  no	  connection	  to	  truth	  and	  knowledge	  at	  all.	  	  	   Second,	   there	   is	   reason	   to	   believe	   that	   this	   structural	   difference	   is	   a	  difference	  worth	  marking	  in	  epistemology.	  In	  fact,	   it	   is	  a	  difference	  worth	  marking	   as	   a	   distinctively	   normative	   difference.	   To	   see	   this,	   note	   that	   as	  epistemic	  agents	  we	  frequently	  ask	  the	  same	  or	  at	  least	  similar	  questions.	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Moreover,	   we	   use	   the	   same	   ways	   of	   belief	   formation	   to	   answer	   these	  questions.	  Given	  that	  this	  is	  so,	  however,	  it	  makes	  sense	  to	  accord	  positive	  normative	  status	  to	  beliefs	  that	  are	  formed	  by	  ways	  of	  belief	  formation	  that	  enjoy	  a	  strong	  tie	  to	  truth	  and	  knowledge.	  After	  all,	  so	  doing	  will	  reinforce	  the	   epistemic	   behavior	   of	   those	   using	   these	  ways	   of	   belief	   formation.	   By	  granting	  Ned	  positive	  normative	   status	   for	  his	  beliefs,	  we	  are	   reinforcing	  his	  use	  of	  his	  ways	  of	  belief	  formation.	  Moreover,	  we	  also	  encourage	  others	  who	  might	  be	  using	  the	  same	  ways	  of	  belief	  formation	  to	  continue	  doing	  so.	  Given	  their	  strong	  tie	  to	  truth	  and	  knowledge,	  this	  clearly	  is	  a	  good	  idea.	  	  	   Correlatively,	   it	  also	  makes	  sense	  to	  accord	  negative	  normative	  status	  to	  beliefs	  that	  are	  formed	  by	  ways	  of	  belief	  formation	  that	  do	  not	  enjoy	  any	  connection	  to	  truth	  and	  knowledge	  as	  so	  doing	  will	  incentivize	  those	  using	  such	  ways	  of	  belief	   formation	  to	  stop	  doing	  so.	  By	  according	  Brianna	  and	  Ben’s	  beliefs	  negative	  normative	  status,	  we	  are	  criticising	  them	  for	  forming	  beliefs	  in	  the	  way	  they	  do	  and	  we	  signal	  to	  others	  not	  to	  adopt	  such	  ways	  of	  belief	   formation.	   Given	   that	   these	   ways	   of	   belief	   formation	   enjoy	   no	  connection	  to	  truth	  and	  knowledge,	  this	  is	  also	  clearly	  a	  good	  idea.	  	  Finally,	  while	  it	  makes	  sense	  to	  accord	  negative	  normative	  status	  here,	  it	  also	  makes	  sense	  to	  grant	  Brianna	  and	  Ben	  an	  excuse.	  After	  all,	  their	  use	  of	   that	  way	  of	  belief	   formation	  was	  out	  of	   their	   control	   (Brianna)	  or	  else	  done	  in	  good	  conscience	  (Ben).	  It	   thus	   comes	   to	   light	   not	   only	   that	   there	   is	   an	   important	   structural	  difference	  between	  the	  cases	  of	  Ned	  on	  the	  one	  hand	  and	  Ben	  and	  Brianna	  on	   the	   other,	   but	   also	   that	   it	   makes	   sense	   to	   mark	   this	   difference	   as	   a	  distinctively	   normative	   difference.	   In	   particular,	   while	   it	   makes	   sense	   to	  grant	  Ned’s	  beliefs	  positive	  normative	  status,	  the	  same	  is	  not	  true	  of	  Ben’s	  and	   Brianna’s	   beliefs,	   to	   which	   it	   makes	   sense	   to	   accord	   negative	   such	  status,	  albeit	  with	  an	  excuse.	  It	  should	  now	  be	  clear	  that	  those	  pursuing	  the	  Williamson-­‐Littlejohn	   line	   will	   be	   hard	   pressed	   to	   accommodate	   this	  distinction.	  Since	  it	  is	  a	  distinction	  it	  makes	  sense	  to	  accommodate,	  this	  is	  bad	  news	  for	  them.	  	  	   	  	  	  
4.	  A	  New	  Normative	  Framework	  	  	  In	  the	  beginning	  of	  this	  paper,	  we	  identified	  a	  dilemma	  according	  to	  which	  we	   either	   adopt	   a	   factive	   norm	   of	   belief	   in	   which	   case	   we	   can	   explain	  what’s	  bad	  about	  false	  beliefs	  but	  won’t	  be	  able	  to	  allow	  radically	  deceived	  agents	   to	   have	   justified	   beliefs,	   or	   else	   we	   adopt	   a	   non-­‐factive	   norm	   of	  belief	   in	   which	   case	   we	   may	   just	   be	   able	   to	   accommodate	   radically	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deceived	  agents	  but	  will	  no	  longer	  be	  able	  to	  explain	  what’s	  bad	  about	  false	  beliefs.	  	   In	   the	   meantime,	   we	   have	   seen	   that	   there	   is	   intuitive	   as	   well	   as	  theoretical	   reason	   to	   accord	   the	   beliefs	   of	   radically	   deceived	   agents	  positive	   normative	   status.	   By	   the	   same	   token,	   there	   is	   reason	   to	   believe	  that	  they	  satisfy	  the	  norm	  of	  belief.	  It	  looks	  as	  though	  the	  proper	  way	  out	  of	  the	  PJD	  is	  by	  opting	  for	  a	  non-­‐factive	  norm	  of	  belief	  and	  loosening	  up	  the	  tie	  between	   justification	  and	  truth.	  Of	  course,	   this	  means	  that	  we	  are	  still	  facing	   the	  question	  of	  why	   false	  beliefs	   are	  bad.	  This	   section	   attempts	   to	  offer	   an	   independently	   motivated	   answer	   to	   this	   question	   that	  simultaneously	   allows	   us	   to	   hold	   on	   to	   DTB	   and	   to	   grant	   justification	   to	  radically	  deceived	  agents.9	  In	  a	  nutshell,	  what	  we	  will	   try	   to	  argue	   is	   that	  the	   above	   is	   actually	   a	   false	   dilemma,	   resting	   on	   a	   mistaken	   normative	  assumption.	  	  	  
4.1	  Prescriptive	  and	  Evaluative	  Norms	  First,	   let	   us	   have	   a	   look	   at	   a	   useful	   distinction	   made	   by	   Conor	   McHugh	  (2012).	  According	  to	  McHugh,	  one	  can	  distinguish	  between	  evaluative	  and	  prescriptive	   norms.	   Prescriptive	   norms	   are	   primarily	   about	   what	   one	  ought	  to	  do;	  they	  prescribe	  certain	  pieces	  of	  conduct	  for	  agents	  (McHugh,	  2012,	   p.9).10	  Paradigmatic	   examples	   of	   prescriptive	   norms	   include	  moral	  norms	   such	   as	   ‘Don’t	   steal’	   or	   ‘Don’t	   lie’	   but	   also	   traffic	   norms	   such	   as	  ‘Drive	  50km/h	  within	  city	  bounds’	  and	  rules	  of	  games	  such	  as	   ‘only	  move	  the	   bishop	   diagonally’	   in	   chess.	   We	   take	   it	   that	   one	   crucial	   function	   of	  prescriptive	   norms	   is	   to	   reinforce	   certain	   forms	   of	   conduct	   (permitted	  ones)	   and	   to	   discourage	   others	   (prohibited	   ones).	   For	   instance,	   one	  function	   of	   the	   traffic	   norm	   that	   requires	   people	   to	   drive	   no	   faster	   than	  50km/h	   within	   city	   bounds	   is	   to	   reinforce	   staying	   within	   the	   50km/h	  speed	  limit	  and	  to	  discourage	  speeding.	  	  	   In	   contrast,	   evaluative	   norms	   regulate	  what	   it	   takes	   for	   a	   token	   of	   a	  particular	  type	  to	  be	  good	  or	  bad	  with	  regard	  to	  its	  type.	  Take,	  for	  instance,	  the	  norm	  that	  a	  good	  hospital	  is	  a	  clean	  hospital,	  that	  a	  good	  knife	  is	  sharp	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  Note	  that	  the	  discussion	  to	  follow,	  although	  mainly	  focusing	  on	  a	  knowledge	  norm	  of	  belief	  for	  simplicity	  and	  readability	  reasons,	  can	  in	  principle	  be	  applied	  to	  other	  factive	  norms	  of	  belief	  as	  well.	  10	  This	  is	  not	  to	  say	  that	  they	  need	  be	  action	  guiding	  in	  a	  strongly	  internalist	  sense,	  that	  is,	  what	   (Williamson	  2008)	  dubs	  perfectly	   operationalizable	  norms:	  norms	  which	   are	   such	  that	   one	   is	   always	   in	   a	   position	   to	   know	  whether	   one	   is	   complying	   with	   them.	   On	   the	  contrary,	  we	  take	  it	  that	  most	  prescriptive	  norms	  are	  not	  thus	  operationalizable;	  take,	  for	  instance,	   the	  norm:	   ‘Drive	  50	  km/hour	  within	   city	  bounds!’	  Whether	  one	   complies	  with	  this	   norm	   is	   not	   something	   that	   one	   is	   always	   in	   a	   position	   to	   know.	   If	   this	   isn’t	  immediately	  obvious,	  just	  imagine	  your	  speedometer	  is	  broken.	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or	  that	  good	  driving	  is	  safe	  driving.	  Evaluative	  norms	  use	  ‘good’	  in	  Geach’s	  (1956)	  attributive	  sense	  (McHugh,	  2012,	  p.22),	  where	  “good”	  functions	  as	  a	  predicate	  modifier,	  rather	  than	  as	  a	  predicate	  in	  its	  own	  right.	  When	  the	  evaluative	   norm	   states	   that	   good	   knives	   are	   sharp,	   it	   merely	   states	   that	  knives	  qua	  knives	  are	   good	   only	   if	   they	   are	   sharp.	   It	   does	   not	   entail	   that	  good	  knives	  are	  good	  simpliciter,11	  or	  good	   for	  some	  purpose	  or	  another.	  Similarly,	   it	   might	   be	   true	   that	   good	   burglars	   are	   stealthy	   (stealth	   thus	  being	  a	  condition	  on	  complying	  with	  the	  evaluative	  norm	  for	  burglars),	  but	  this	  does	  not	  entail	  that	  good	  burglars	  are	  good	  simpliciter.	  	  Evaluative	   norms	   differ	   from	   prescriptive	   norms	   in	   that	   they	   don’t	  prescribe	   a	   certain	   piece	   of	   conduct	   for	   agents.	   This	   is	   not	   to	   say	   that	  evaluative	  norms	  do	  not	  feature	  genuine	  oughts.	  On	  the	  contrary,	  there	  is	  a	  clear	  sense	  in	  which	  evaluative	  norms	  tell	  us	  something	  about	  how	  things	  ought	   to	   be.	   For	   instance,	   the	   aforementioned	   evaluative	   norm	   for	  hospitals	  tells	  us	  that	  hospitals	  ought	  to	  be	  clean,	  the	  norm	  for	  knives	  that	  knives	  ought	  to	  be	  sharp	  and	  the	  norm	  for	  driving	  that	  driving	  ought	  to	  be	  safe.	   But	   this	   does	   not	   detract	   from	   the	   fact	   that	   such	   norms	   still	   do	   not	  prescribe	  a	  certain	  course	  of	  conduct	  and,	  as	  a	  result,	  are	  not	  prescriptive	  norms.	  The	  main	  difference	   lies	   in	   the	   fact	   that,	  while	  prescriptive	  norms	  are	  ought-­‐to-­‐dos,	  evaluative	  norms	  are	  ought-­‐to-­‐bes.	  Evaluative	   and	   prescriptive	   norms	   can	   come	   apart.	   It	   is	   entirely	  possible	  for	  an	  evaluative	  norm	  to	  be	  violated	  without	  a	  prescriptive	  norm	  being	  violated.	  Consider	   for	   instance	   the	   following	  evaluative	  norm:	  good	  sunsets	  are	  not	  too	  cloudy.	  On	  a	  very	  cloudy	  evening	  this	  evaluative	  norm	  will	  be	  not	  be	  satisfied.	  Compatibly	  with	  that,	  no	  prescriptive	  norm	  may	  be	  violated.	   And,	   conversely,	   it	   is	   possible	   to	   violate	   a	   prescriptive	   norm	  without	  violating	  any	  evaluative	  norm.	  Suppose	  your	  boss	  has	   imposed	  a	  completely	   pointless	   rule	   for	   making	   coffee	   according	   to	   which	   coffee	  powder	  must	  be	  scooped	  into	  the	  filter	  alternatingly	  with	  a	  blue	  and	  a	  red	  teaspoon.	  Suppose	  you	  violate	  this	  rule,	  say	  because	  you	  are	  only	  using	  the	  red	  spoon.	  You	  have	  broken	  a	  prescriptive	  rule	   for	  coffee	  making	  at	  your	  office.	  However,	   it	   seems	  plausible	   that	  you	  need	  not	  have	  violated	  some	  evaluative	  norm	  as	  well.	  In	  particular,	  the	  coffee	  that	  you	  are	  making	  may	  still	  be	  good	  coffee,	  the	  way	  in	  which	  you	  are	  making	  it	  may	  still	  be	  a	  good	  way	  of	  making	  coffee	  and	  you	  may	  still	  be	  a	  good	  barista.	  	  While	   evaluative	   norms	   thus	   differ	   from	  prescriptive	   norms,	   the	   two	  may	  still	  be	  related.	  In	  particular,	  prescriptive	  norms	  often	  enough	  derive	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11	  Note	  that	  Geach	  (1956)	  argues	  that	  there’s	  nothing	  more	  to	  good	  simpliciter	  than	  attributive	  goodness.	  For	  some	  problems	  with	  Geach’s	  line,	  see	  Schroeder	  (2012).	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from	  evaluative	  norms.	  They	  serve	  to	  ensure	  that	  evaluative	  norm	  is	  likely	  enough	  complied	  with.	  For	  instance,	  prescriptive	  norms	  of	  driving,	  such	  as	  the	  norm	  ‘Drive	  no	  more	  than	  50km/h	  within	  city	  bounds’,	  serve	  to	  ensure	  that	   the	   evaluative	   norm	  of	   driving	   –	   according	   to	  which	   good	  driving	   is	  safe	  driving	  –	  is	  likely	  enough	  complied	  with.	  In	  this	  way,	  evaluative	  norms	  often	  come	  first	  and	  prescriptive	  norms	  are	  in	  their	  service.	  	  	  
4.2	  Norm	  Coincidence	  With	   the	   distinction	   between	   prescriptive	   and	   evaluative	   norms	   in	   play,	  let’s	   return	   to	   the	   case	   of	   belief.	   In	   particular,	   let’s	   ask	   whether	   factive	  accounts	   of	   the	   norm	   of	   belief	   should	   be	   considered	   evaluative	   or	  prescriptive	  norms.	  For	  simplicity,	  let	  us	  focus	  on	  the	  knowledge	  norm:	  is	  the	   norm	   an	   evaluative	   one,	   i.e.	   stating	   that	   a	   good	   belief	   qualifies	   as	  knowledge?	   Or	   is	   it	   a	   norm	   prescribing	   how	   one	   is	   to	   go	   about	   belief	  formation,	   i.e.	   prescribing	   that	   one	   should	   only	   hold	   knowledgeable	  beliefs?	  One	  answer	  to	  this	  question	  is	  suggested	  in	  the	  following	  passage	  from	  Williamson:	  	  	   “If	  justification	  is	  the	  fundamental	  epistemic	  norm	  of	  belief,	  and	  a	  belief	  ought	  to	  constitute	  knowledge,	  then	  justification	  should	  be	  understood	  in	  terms	  of	  knowledge	  too.	  Indeed,	  a	  belief	  is	  fully	  justified	  if	  and	  only	  if	  it	  constitutes	  knowledge”	  (2014,	  5).	  	  	   It	  would	  seem	  that	  what	  Williamson	  has	  in	  mind	  is	  an	  evaluative	  norm,	  stating	   that	   what	   it	   takes	   for	   a	   belief	   to	   be	   a	   good	   belief	   is	   for	   it	   to	   be	  knowledge.	  After	  all,	  what	  Williamson	  says	  here	  is	  that	  a	  belief	  ought	  to	  be	  knowledge	   and	   we	   saw	   that	   ought-­‐to-­‐bes	   are	   the	   stuff	   that	   evaluative	  norms	  are	  made	  of.12	  It	   appears,	   then,	   that	  Williamson	   is	   attracted	   to	   the	  following:	  	  
The	  Evaluative	  Knowledge	  Norm	  of	  Belief	  (EKNB).	  One’s	  belief	  that	  p	  is	  a	  good	  belief	  iff	  one	  knows	  that	  p.	  	  	  	   But	  now	  recall	  that	  Williamson	  also	  accepts:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  This	  also	  gets	  further	  confirmation	  in	  several	  other	  places	  in	  Williamson	  (2000,	  2014).	  For	  instance,	  according	  to	  Williamson,	  “[k]nowledge	  sets	  the	  standard	  of	  appropriateness	  for	  belief.	  […]	  Mere	  believing	  is	  a	  kind	  of	  botched	  knowing.	  In	  short,	  belief	  aims	  at	  knowledge”	  (2000,	  p.47).	  After	  all,	  the	  thesis	  that	  knowledge	  is	  the	  evaluative	  norm	  of	  belief,	  and	  so	  a	  good	  belief	  is	  one	  that	  qualifies	  as	  knowledge,	  is	  an	  attractive	  way	  of	  making	  sense	  of	  the	  slogans	  that	  mere	  believing	  is	  a	  kind	  of	  botched	  knowing	  and	  that	  belief	  aims	  at	  knowledge.	  
	   16	  
	  
The	   Knowledge	   Norm	   of	   Belief	   (KNB).	   One	  must:	   believe	   that	   p	   iff	  one	  knows	  that	  p.	  	  	  Note	  that	  KNB	  is	  an	  ought-­‐to-­‐do	  rather	  than	  an	  ought-­‐to-­‐be;	  that	  is,	  a	  norm	  that	  prescribes	  a	  certain	  piece	  of	  conduct	  for	  agents,	  and	  is	  an	  apt	  guide	  for	  conduct.	  KNB	  tells	  us	  how	  one	  must	  go	  about	  believing.	  Unlike	  EKNB,	  KNB	  is	  therefore	  a	  prescriptive	  norm.	  It	  is	  easy	  to	  see	  that	  EKNB	  and	  KNB	  jointly	  entail:	  	  
The	  Coincidence	  Thesis	  for	  Belief	  (CTB).	  A	  belief	  is	  good	  (i.e.	  satisfies	  the	  evaluative	  norm	  of	  belief)	  iff	  it	  satisfies	  the	  prescriptive	  norm	  of	  belief.	  	  	  	   Now,	  we	  do	  not	  mean	  to	  suggest	  that	  there	  is	  a	  principled	  reason	  why	  in	   the	   case	   of	   belief	   the	   evaluative	   and	   prescriptive	   norms	   couldn’t	  coincide.	  However,	  as	  the	  discussion	  in	  the	  previous	  subsection	  indicated,	  there	   also	   is	   little	   reason	   to	   think	   that	   the	   two	   must	   go	   hand	   in	   hand.	  Furthermore,	  one	  serious	  downside	  of	  CTB	   is	   that	   it	   leads	  straight	   to	   the	  permissibility-­‐justification	   dilemma.	   After	   all,	   if	   the	   evaluative	   and	   the	  prescriptive	  norms	  for	  belief	  coincide,	  they	  will	  either	  both	  be	  non-­‐factive,	  and	  thus	  fail	  to	  explain	  what	  is	  wrong	  with	  false	  beliefs,	  or	  they	  will	  both	  be	  factive	   and	   thus,	   in	   conjunction	   with	   DTB,	   will	   deny	   justification	   to	  radically	   deceived	   subjects.	   	   Another	   downside,	  which	   specifically	   affects	  champions	  of	  a	  knowledge	  norm	  of	  belief,	  is	  that	  it	  forces	  them	  to	  exit	  PJD	  via	   the	   first	  horn,	   i.e.	  by	  denying	   justification	  to	  radically	  deceived	  agents	  (at	  least	  given	  DTB).	  And	  we	  have	  already	  seen	  that	  there	  is	  reason	  not	  to	  do	  so.	  We	  believe	  that	  PJD	  is	  ultimately	  rooted	  in	  CTB.	  Once	  we	  abandon	  CTB	  and	   keep	   the	   evaluative	   norm	   of	   belief	   neatly	   separated	   from	   its	  prescriptive	   cousin,	   a	  way	   out	   of	   PJD	   opens	   up.	   This	  way	   is	   attractive	   in	  that	   it	   not	   only	   allows	  us	   to	   accommodate	   both	  NFB	   and	   JFB,	   but	   is	   also	  backed	   by	   an	   independently	   plausible	   normative	   framework	   and	   is	  available	   to	   knowledge	   firsters.	   In	   the	   remainder	   of	   the	   section,	   we	   will	  sketch	  how	  it	  goes.	  	  	  	  
4.3	  Our	  Alternative	  We	  have	  seen	  that,	  generally	  speaking,	  evaluative	  and	  prescriptive	  norms	  can	  come	  apart	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  it	  is	  at	  least	  in	  principle	  possible	  to	  violate	  a	  certain	  evaluative	  norm	  without	  violating	  any	  prescriptive	  norm	  and	  vice	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versa.	  The	  key	  idea	  of	  our	  proposal	  is	  to	  allow	  that,	  in	  the	  case	  of	  belief,	  the	  evaluative	  and	  prescriptive	  norms	  can	  come	  apart	  also.	   In	  particular,	   it	   is	  possible	  to	  violate	  the	  evaluative	  norm	  of	  belief	  whilst	  complying	  with	  the	  prescriptive	  norm.	  This	  will	  allow	  us	  to	  adopt	  an	  evaluative	  norm	  of	  belief	  that	   is	   factive	  whilst	   leaving	   room	   for	  a	  prescriptive	  norm	   that	   isn’t.	   It	   is	  easy	   to	   see	   that	   this	  opens	  up	   the	  possibility	  of	  exiting	  PJD	   in	  a	  way	   that	  accommodates	  both	  NFB,	   that	   there	   is	   something	  bad	  about	   false	  beliefs,	  and	  JFB,	  that	  radically	  deceived	  agents	  are	  still	  justified.	  After	  all,	  given	  the	  factive	  evaluative	  norm,	  false	  beliefs	  will	  violate	  this	  norm	  and	  so	  won’t	  be	  good	  beliefs.	  And,	  if	  we	  take	  ‘permissibility’	  in	  DTB	  to	  be	  permissibility	  by	  the	   non-­‐factive,	   prescriptive	   norm,	   there	   is	   no	   longer	   any	   in-­‐principle	  obstacle	  to	  allowing	  that	  radically	  deceived	  agents	  believe	  justifiably.	  To	  see	  why	   this	  makes	  good	  normative	  sense,	   recall	   first	   that	   section	  3.2	   offered	   a	   detailed	   argument	   in	   favor	   of	   according	   positive	   normative	  status	   to	   the	   beliefs	   of	   agents	   in	   radical	   skeptical	   scenarios.	   This	   was	  because	   their	   ways	   of	   belief	   formation	   are	   connected	   to	   true	   belief	   and	  knowledge	  and	  that	  it	  makes	  sense	  to	  reinforce	  use	  of	  such	  ways	  of	  belief	  formation.	  But	  now	  recall	  also	  that	  a	  key	  function	  of	  prescriptive	  norms	  is	  precisely	   to	   reinforce	   certain	   forms	   of	   conduct	   by	   permitting	   them.	   The	  normative	  profile	  of	  the	  beliefs	  of	  radically	  deceived	  agents	  (as	  per	  section	  3.2)	   is	   thus	   just	   what	   we	   would	   expect	   it	   to	   be	   were	   these	   beliefs	   in	  compliance	   with	   the	   prescriptive	   norm	   of	   belief.	   One	   highly	   attractive	  explanation	   of	   this	   fact	   is	   that	   these	   beliefs	   do	   indeed	   satisfy	   the	  prescriptive	  norm	  of	  belief.	  We	  thus	  have	  good	  abductive	  reason	  to	   think	  that	   radically	   deceived	   agents	   do	   indeed	   comply	   with	   the	   prescriptive	  norm	  of	  belief.	  	  At	   the	   same	   time,	   second,	   it	   remains	   highly	   plausible	   that	   there	   is	  something	   bad	   about	   false	   beliefs,	   i.e.	   that	   they	   have	   negative	   normative	  status.	  If	  so,	  it	  also	  remains	  plausible	  that	  there	  is	  some	  norm	  of	  belief	  that	  is	   violated	   by	   false	   beliefs.	   Of	   course,	   if	   even	   radically	   deceived	   agents	  satisfy	  the	  prescriptive	  norm	  of	  belief,	  the	  norm	  of	  belief	  that	  false	  beliefs	  violate	  cannot	  be	  the	  prescriptive	  norm.	  So,	  it	  has	  to	  be	  a	  different	  kind	  of	  norm.	   Our	   proposal	   that	   it	   is	   the	   evaluative	   norm	   not	   only	   answers	   the	  question	   as	   to	  which	   kind	   of	   norm	   this	  might	   be,	   it	   also	   fits	   the	   original	  intuition	  that	  there	  is	  something	  bad	  about	  false	  beliefs.	  	   Moreover,	  our	  proposal	   is	  open	  to	  knowledge	  firsters.	  To	  see	  this,	  note	   first	   that	  knowledge	   firsters	  are	   free	   to	  adopt	  an	  evaluative	  norm	  of	  belief	  according	  to	  which	  good	  belief	  is	  belief	  that	  qualifies	  as	  knowledge.	  This	   leaves	   the	  question	  as	   to	  whether	   the	  prescriptive	  norm	  can	  also	  be	  understood	  in	  a	  knowledge	  first	  friendly	  fashion.	  Again,	  the	  answer	  is	  yes.	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To	   see	   this,	   suppose	   that,	   even	   though	   the	   evaluative	   and	   prescriptive	  norms	  of	  belief	  come	  apart,	  they	  are	  also	  related	  in	  much	  the	  same	  way	  in	  which	  we	   found	   these	  kinds	  of	  norm	   to	  be	   related	   in	   the	   traffic	   case:	   the	  prescriptive	  norms	  serve	  to	  ensure	  that	  the	  evaluative	  norm	  is	  often	  likely	  enough	  satisfied,	   at	   least	   in	   suitable	   circumstances.	   If	   so,	   the	  prescriptive	  norm	   of	   belief	   is	   derivative	   from	   the	   evaluative	   norm.	   And,	   since	   the	  evaluative	  norm	  of	  belief	  is	  knowledge,	  there	  is	  still	  a	  clear	  sense	  in	  which	  knowledge	   comes	   first	   in	   this	   framework.	  What	  we	  will	   have,	   then,	   is	   an	  account	   of	   the	   normativity	   of	   belief	   that	   avoids	   PJD,	   is	   available	   to	  knowledge	   firsters,	   and	   enjoys	   backing	   by	   an	   attractive	   normative	  framework.13	  	  Now,	   one	   might	   worry	   whether	   there	   actually	   is	   some	   substantive	  account	  of	  the	  prescriptive	  norm	  of	  belief	  that	  is	  both	  knowledge	  first	  and	  fits	   the	  above	  description	   in	   the	   sense	   that	   the	  prescriptive	  norm	   is	  non-­‐factive	   and	   can	   be	   viewed	   as	   derivative	   from	   the	   evaluative	   norm	   in	   the	  way	  envisaged.	  Fortunately,	  there	  are	  a	  number	  of	  accounts	  that	  fit	  the	  bill.	  For	   present	   purposes	   we	   will	   focus	   on	   two	   here,	   each	   one	   has	   been	  advocated	  by	  some	  of	  us	  elsewhere.	  The	  first	  is	  Simion’s	  (2016)	  knowledge	  first	  functionalism.	  The	  account	  is	  proper	  functionalist	  in	  that	  it	  takes	  the	  epistemic	  normativity	  of	  belief	  to	  drop	   out	   of	   the	   epistemic	   function 14 	  of	   our	   cognitive	   systems.	   It	   is	  knowledge-­‐first	   epistemological	   in	   that,	   unlike	   traditional	   proper	  functionalism,	  it	  unpacks	  the	  function	  at	  issue	  here	  in	  terms	  of	  knowledge.	  Roughly,	  the	  thought	  goes	  as	  follows:	  just	  as	  the	  economic	  function	  of	  knife	  producing	  systems	  is	  to	  produce	  good,	  sharp	  knives,	  the	  epistemic	  function	  of	   our	   belief	   forming	   systems	   is	   to	   produce	   good,	   knowledgeable	   beliefs.	  Mere	  belief,	  then,	  is	  a	  failure	  on	  the	  part	  of	  our	  cognitive	  system	  to	  fulfill	  its	  epistemic	   function	   just	   as	   blunt	   knives	   are	   failures	   on	   the	   part	   of	   knife	  producers	  to	   fulfill	   their	  economic	   function.	   In	  turn,	   functions	  give	  rise	  to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  13	  That	  said,	  we	  admittedly	  have	  argued	  neither	  that	  knowledge	  is	  indeed	  the	  evaluative	  norm	  of	  belief,	  nor	  that,	  in	  the	  case	  of	  belief,	  the	  prescriptive	  norm	  serves	  to	  ensure	  that	  the	  evaluative	  norm	  is	  likely	  enough	  satisfied.	  We	  do	  not	  mean	  to	  deny	  that	  these	  theses	  are	  of	  some	  importance	  to	  knowledge	  firsters	  who	  want	  to	  appeal	  to	  our	  account	  in	  order	  to	   avoid	   PJD.	   At	   the	   same	   time,	   our	   mission	   here	   is	   not	   to	   mount	   a	   full	   defense	   of	  knowledge	  first	  epistemology	  in	  general	  or	  some	  specific	  version	  thereof.	  Rather,	  our	  aim	  is	  the	  more	  modest	  one	  of	  arguing	  that	  knowledge	  first	  epistemology	  is	  not	  brought	  down	  by	  PJD.	  The	  fact	  that	  an	  independently	  plausible	  account	  of	  the	  normativity	  of	  belief	  will	  allow	  knowledge	  firsters	  to	  exit	  PJD,	  at	  least	  modulo	  certain	  further	  assumptions,	  should	  be	  enough	  to	  do	  the	  trick	  here.	  14	  The	  account	  is	  modeled	  on	  etiological	  functionalist	  accounts,	  championed	  e.g.	  by	  Ruth	  Millikan	  (1984)	  and	  in	  epistemology	  by	  Peter	  Graham	  (2011).	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prescriptive	  norms:	   a	   token	  of	   type	  T	  with	   function	  F	  will	  be	   functioning	  properly	  when	   functioning	   normally,	   i.e.	   in	   the	  way	   in	  which	   it	   did	   back	  when	  it	  acquired	  its	  function.	  Knife	  producing	  systems	  will	  be	  functioning	  properly	  when	  functioning	  normally,	  that	   is,	   in	  the	  way	  in	  which	  they	  did	  when	   they	   acquired	   their	   economic	   function	   of	   producing	   sharp	   knives.	  Similarly,	   our	   cognitive	   systems	   will	   be	   functioning	   properly	   when	  functioning	   normally,	   that	   is,	   in	   the	  way	   they	   functioned	  back	   in	   the	   day	  when	  they	  acquired	  the	  function	  of	  generating	  knowledge.	  	  On	   this	   view,	   then,	   epistemic	   justification	   consists	   in	   the	   proper	  performance	  of	  cognitive	  systems	  that	  have	  generating	  knowledge	  as	  their	  epistemic	   function.	   The	   standards	   for	   normal	   functioning	   are	   thus	  constitutively	  associated	  with	  promoting	  knowledgeable	  beliefs.	  	  Of	  course,	  normal	  functioning	  need	  not	  imply	  function	  fulfillment;	  knife	  producers	   can	   function	   normally—i.e.,	   follow	   the	   normal	   production	  steps—and	   still	   fail	   to	   fulfill	   their	   economic	   function	   of	   producing	   sharp	  knives,	   due	   to,	   say,	   unfriendly	   environmental	   conditions.	   Similarly,	   our	  cognitive	   systems	   can	   function	   normally,	   but	   still	   fail	   to	   produce	  knowledgeable	  beliefs.	   It	   is	  easy	  to	  see	  that,	  on	  this	  account,	  Ned’s	  beliefs	  come	   out	   as	   justified,	   for	   his	   cognitive	   systems,	   the	   ones	   in	   charge	   with	  generating	   knowledgeable	   beliefs,	   are	   functioning	   normally	   and,	   as	   such, 
comply with the epistemic prescriptive norm (cf. Graham 2012 for a similar 
account within the traditionalist framework). At the same time, however, Ned’s 
cognitive system fails to fulfill its epistemic function of producing 
knowledgeable belief. As a result, Ned’s beliefs are not good beliefs. Let’s	   then	   move	   on	   to	   the	   second	   view,	   which	   is	   the	   knowledge	   first	  version	   of	   virtue	   epistemology,	   defended	   in	   (Kelp	   Forthcoming-­‐a,b,	   Kelp	  and	  Ghijsen	   2016).	   According	   to	   this	   view,	   inquiry	   is	   taken	   to	   be	   a	   goal-­‐directed	   practice	   with	   moves	   and	   success,	   like	   target	   archery.	   In	   target	  archery,	  moves	  are	  shots	  and	  successes	  hits.	   In	   inquiry,	  beliefs	  are	  moves	  and	  knowledge	  is	  success.	  Besides	  success,	  moves	  in	  such	  practices	  can	  be	  assessed	   as	   competent	   and	   apt.	   In	   particular,	   a	   move	   is	   competent	   iff,	  roughly,	   it	   is	   the	   result	   of	   an	   ability	   to	   produce	   successful	  moves.	   In	   the	  case	  of	  inquiry,	  this	  means	  that	  a	  competent	  belief	  is,	  roughly,	  belief	  that	  is	  produced	  by	  an	  ability	  to	  know.	  One	  key	  thesis	  is	  that	  a	  belief	  is	  justified	  iff	  it	  is	  competent	  in	  this	  sense.	  By	  DTB,	  this	  means	  that	  a	  belief	  satisfies	  the	  prescriptive	  norm	  of	  belief	  iff	  it	  is	  competent.	  Now,	  moves	  in	  general	  can	  be	  competent	  without	  being	  successful.	  One	  can	  fire	  a	  competent	  shot	  that	  misses	  the	  target,	  thanks	  to	  a	  gust	  of	  wind,	  say.	  Belief	  makes	  no	  exception	  here.	  This	  means	  that	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  have	  justified	   beliefs	   that	   fall	   short	   of	   knowledge.	   What’s	   more,	   as	   (Kelp	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Forthcoming-­‐b,	   Kelp	   and	   Ghijsen	   2016)	   argues	   in	   some	   detail,	   this	   view	  also	  allows	  for	  justified	  false	  belief.	  In	  fact,	  the	  view	  grants	  agents	  in	  radical	  skeptical	   scenarios	   justified	   belief	   (Kelp	   and	   Ghijsen	   2016,	   p.181,	   n.14).	  Given	  DTB,	  we	  get	  a	  substantive	  account	  of	  the	  prescriptive	  norm	  of	  belief	  according	   to	   which	   this	   norm	   is	   not	   factive	   and	   is	   satisfied	   by	   radically	  deceived	  agents.	  JFB	  is	  accommodated.	  Finally,	   let’s	   turn	   to	   the	   question	   of	   the	   relation	   between	   the	  prescriptive	  and	  the	  evaluative	  norm.	  To	  answer	  it,	  let’s	  take	  another	  look	  at	   the	   phenomenon	   of	   a	   competent	   shot	   in	   target	   archery.	   Why	   do	   we	  accord	  positive	  normative	  status	  to	  such	  shots?	  Very	  plausibly	  the	  answer	  is	  that	  competent	  shots	  are	  produced	  by	  an	  ability	  to	  hit	  the	  target	  and	  that	  such	  an	  ability	  makes	  successes	  highly	  likely.15	  Given	  that	  this	  is	  so,	  there	  is	  reason	  to	  believe	  that	  the	  positive	  normative	  status	  of	  a	  competent	  shot	  in	  target	   archery	  derives	   from	   the	  positive	  normative	   status	   of	   a	   success	   in	  that	   practice.	   After	   all,	   competent	   shots	   enjoy	   positive	   normative	   status	  because	  they	  are	  produced	  in	  a	  way	  that	  makes	  successes	  likely,	  at	  least	  in	  favorable	  circumstances.	  Mutatis	  mutandis,	  in	  the	  case	  of	  belief	  we	  get	  the	  result	  that	  competent	  beliefs	  enjoy	  positive	  normative	  status	  because	  they	  are	   likely	   to	   be	   successful—i.e.	   to	   qualify	   as	   knowledge—at	   least	   in	  favorable	  circumstances.	  Since,	  on	  the	  present	  view,	  one	  complies	  with	  the	  prescriptive	   norm	   of	   belief	   just	   if	   one	   believes	   competently	   and	  with	   its	  evaluative	  cousin	  just	  if	  one	  knows,	  this	  means	  that	  the	  prescriptive	  norm	  of	  belief	  is	  derivative	  of	  the	  evaluative	  in	  just	  the	  way	  envisaged.	  	  	   	  
5.	  Conclusion	  	  	  We	   have	   argued	   that	   the	   beliefs	   of	   radically	   deceived	   subjects	   appear	   to	  have	  an	  epistemic	   status	   that	   is	   better	   than	  mere	  blamelessness	  or	  mere	  excuse.	  What’s	  more,	  the	  idea	  that	  false	  beliefs	  can	  still	  be	  justified	  makes	  sense	  both	  from	  the	  way	  in	  which	  norms	  work	  in	  general,	  and	  from	  a	  social	  perspective	  in	  which	  one	  wants	  to	  reinforce	  ways	  of	  belief-­‐formation	  that	  are	   strongly	   connected	   to	   truth	   and	   knowledge.	   These	   considerations	  cannot	  be	  accommodated	  by	  either	  Williamson’s	  or	  Littlejohn’s	  normative	  framework,	   in	   which	   knowledge	   remains	   the	   norm	   of	   belief,	   and	   false	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  15	  Isn’t	  it	  more	  plausible	  that	  it	  is	  connection	  to	  aptness	  rather	  than	  success	  that	  explains	  the	  positive	  normative	  status	  of	  competent	  moves?	  Perhaps.	  But	  note	  that,	  for	  present	  purposes,	  this	  issue	  is	  of	  little	  consequence.	  After	  all,	  on	  the	  account,	  in	  the	  case	  of	  inquiry,	  a	  move	  is	  successful	  iff	  apt.	  In	  other	  words,	  a	  belief	  is	  successful	  iff	  it	  is	  apt	  iff	  it	  qualifies	  as	  knowledge	  (Kelp	  Forthcoming-­‐a).	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beliefs	  can	  at	  best	  be	  excusably	  held.	  In	  contrast	  to	  these	  theories,	  we	  have	  proposed	  a	  framework	  in	  which	  knowledge	  is	  taken	  as	  the	  evaluative	  norm	  of	   belief,	   and	   justification	   arises	   from	   compliance	   with	   an	   associated	  prescriptive	  norm	  of	  belief	  where	  prescriptive	  norms	  have	  the	  function	  of	  ensuring	   that	   the	   corresponding	   evaluative	   norms	   are	   often	   enough	  satisfied.	  One	   can	   thus	  uphold	   a	   genuinely	   knowledge-­‐first	   framework	  of	  knowledge	   and	   justification	  without	   upholding	   the	   idea	   that	   false	   beliefs	  cannot	  be	  justified.	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